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A handful of studies agree that mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have become an increasingly 
popular channel to boost profitability, increase market power, improve performance, and a 
major strategy for firm growth (e.g., Mantecon, 2008; Wan and Yiu, 2009).  Beyond national 
boundaries, many firms also utilise M&As as an internationalisation strategy to build foreign 
presence (King et al., 2004). According to Thomson Reuters’ 2017 M&As review, global 
M&As activity was about 3.6 trillion US dollars in 2017. This represents 50% increase from 
2.4 trillion US dollars announced deals in 2010 (Thompson Reuters, 2010). 
Surprisingly, despite the staggering popularity of M&As as an essential means of firm 
expansion and control of resources [e.g., Harrison et al., (2001) and Savor and Lu (2009)], 
there is dearth in empirical evidence on the role of government support in mergers and 
acquisition, most especially in emerging economies such as Russia, China, India and Brazil 
were state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are still an important feature of the modern day 
economies (Del Bo et al., 2017). Government involvement may provide acquirers with access 
to strategic resources such as cheaper source of finance (Guariglia et al., 2011), and enables 
the SOEs to be able to bear short-term losses and offers them ample resources to overcome 
risks and uncertainties.2 For example, whilst the majority of Chinese banks are government 
owned, their main function is to provide support for SOEs' economic activities (Morck et al., 
2008), limiting private firms (non-SOEs) competitive financing and liquidity opportunities. 
Not surprising that Zhou et al. (2015) document that SOE acquirers outperform non-SOEs 
acquirers. Therefore, government involvement in acquisition may influence bidding firm 
positive abnormal returns. On the contrary, government support can be counterproductive,   
leading to value-losing acquisitions (Black et al., 2015). Chen and Young (2010) document 
investor negative reaction to cross-border M&As of Chinese firms with government 
involvement. Given these contrasting standpoints, the first goal of the study is to provide 
further insight to the literature on M&As by answering the question: does government (non) 
involvement in acquirer’s merger activities impact on short-term performance? 
In related literature, the choice of payment method (such as cash, stock, or mixed) is an 
important issue in the M&A process. A significant body of literature provides mix evidence of 




2 In this study, government involvement includes both domestic and cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
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the impact of choice of payment on firm performance (Fuller et al., 2002; Faccio and Masulis, 
2005; Cho and Ahn, 2017). Savor and Lu (2009), for example, find evidence that equity-
financed deals generate significantly negative average returns to acquirers compared to cash-
financed deals. In contrast, Dutta et al. (2013) document a positive impact of using stock as 
method of payment in cross-border M&A deals. 3  Given these inconsistent views of the 
influence of payment methods in the M&A process, which has also been overlooked in 
empirical studies of emerging market (Fischer, 2017), the next goal of the study is to answer 
the question: does mode of payment create wealth for bidding shareholders with government 
(non) involvement in the short-term?   
Moreover, the choice of target firm (public or private) also influences acquirer’s performance 
(Draper and Paudyal, 2006). Mantecon (2008) documents that acquirers benefit from the 
acquisition of privately held firms but do not gain in the purchase of publicly traded firms. 
Though some studies on M&A have extensively analysed the acquirer’s performance in 
relation to publicly held targets, research of their performance relating to privately held targets 
firms remain largely unexplored (e.g., Shen, 2006); and majority of acquisitions involve private 
firms (Erel et al., 2012). Furthermore, examining the post-acquisition performance of bidding 
firms based only on publicly traded firms’ raise an econometric concern that the ordinary least 
square regression might suffer from sample selection bias (e.g., Heckman, 1979). Given this 
viewpoint, the third goal of this study is to examine whether payment method creates wealth 
for acquiring shareholders with privately held or publicly held targets in the short-run?   
Indeed, the M&A deals are prevalent not only in the developed markets but also in the emerging 
markets. However, as noted in Dutta and Jog (2009), many of these studies suffer from data 
mining biases because they exhibit a heavy focus on the well-established markets such as the 
United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK). The existing literature on M&A has paid little 
attention on emerging countries (e.g., Erel et al., 2012; Thanos and Papadakis, 2012) and thus 
limits the generalisability of the findings. The focus on well-established markets may be due 
to better accounting reporting standards that ensures high quality of data (e.g., Chui and Kwok, 
1998). While several studies on merger activities focus on publicly held firms in the US, the 




3 The terms mergers, acquisitions, mergers and acquisitions, takeovers, deals and transactions are used 
interchangeably in this paper. 
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greater number of international acquisitions is private and does not involve the US firms (Erel 
et al., 2012). Moreover, the worldwide growth in international takeovers (Thompson Reuters, 
2017) and the new globalisation trend that involves cross-border merger activities (Lebedev et 
al., 2015) has significant implications relating to the emerging economies. Our study therefore 
provides novel evidence and advances our understanding of the effects of mergers and 
acquisitions on short-term post-acquisition performance related to emerging markets.   
Despite reforming for many years, Chinese government still plays crucial role in business 
activities; and corporate investment and financing decisions are significantly influenced by 
government intervention (Firth et al., 2008). As a direct means of resource reallocation and 
ownership transfer, M&As might therefore be influenced by the government to achieve 
political and economic goals. For instance, acquirers with the government involvement might 
have comparative advantage and enjoy strict control of ownerships and hence, take advantage 
of access to special loans in line with government priorities, such as low interest loans from 
government-owned banks in M&A deals. Thus, the above characteristics make the Chinese 
market an ideal setting to examine the impact of M&As on the bidder’s performance.  
Though China has a large population and second largest investing country globally (Fan et al., 
2011 and UNCTAD, 2017), their capital market remains underdeveloped (Lin and Ye, 2018). 
This has been associated with poor information asymmetry (Piotroski and Wong, 2012) which 
allows government to facilitate acquisitions especially for SOEs. Moreover, China has been 
the fastest growing economy in recent decades with completed worldwide acquisition trading 
volume of 2655, and with transaction value of approximately $300 billion at end of 2017 
(Thompson Reuters, 2017).4 However, most of the deals are conducted by Chinese state-owned 
enterprise (SOE) and existing evidence about the Chinese M&A activities is fairly limited 
(Ahlstrom et al., 2014; Lebedev et al., 2015). Thus, the study contributes to the sparse literature 
on the association between the roles of (Chinese) government policy and acquirer’s post-
acquisition performance. Thus, our empirical analysis of China has significant implications for 
emerging economies with large population and geographic size but with underdeveloped capital 
markets. 








Our study makes important contribution to existing M&As literature by providing a 
comprehensive evidence of the effects of merger activities on Chinese acquirer’s short-term 
performance. First, our result shows that unlike most advanced economies were bidder 
shareholders experience negative abnormal returns from acquisition (Fuller et al., 2002 and 
Nnadi and Aghanya, 2018), Chinese acquirer shareholders experience positive abnormal return 
from the acquisition. Second, we also extend to the literature on the choice of payment in M&A 
transactions. We show that contrary to substantial empirical evidence that cash-financed 
acquisitions is preferred ( Draper and Paudyal, 2006, Fu et al., 2013, and Black et al., 2015), 
our study shows that in the Chinese context, shareholders perceive that stock-financed 
acquisition maximise the wealth gains. Third, our study also conducts a comprehensive 
analysis of the effect of government involvement in acquisition in relation to the payment 
methods. Our results show that in the case of Chinese acquisitions, the mean difference is 
negative and statistically significant on the announcement date, suggesting SOEs have higher 
corporate liquidity (or cheaper source of finance) that favours cash-financed acquisitions. 
Finally, our study also conducts a comprehensive analysis of bidder’s choice of target firms in 
relation to the different payment methods. Our findings show that the market experience more 
positive abnormal return using stock as financing decision for the acquisition of privately held 
targets.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 is the theoretical background, literature 
and hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data used in the study and research methodology. 
Section 4 is the empirical results and discussion of findings while Section 5 is the conclusion.   
 
 
2. Theoretical background, Literature review and hypothesis development  
the choice of payment can have a substantial effect on corporate control, taxation, risk bearing, 
financial leverage, cash flow implications, and ownership structure of the bidding and target 
firms, and as well as on shareholders. Several studies document that M&A financing decision: 
a choice of stock, cash only or a combination of cash and stock can   influence share price 
performance (e.g., Faccio and Masulis, 2005; and Harford et al. 2009).  
Our study is based on the asymmetric information theory argues that unequal information exists 
between inside managements and outside investors. Therefore management will exploit the 
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market condition and offer stock exchange when the bidding firm stock is overvalued by the 
market but offer cash on the opposite condition (e.g., see Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Interestingly, investors who do not have superior information as managers do, will take a stock-
financed acquisition as a signal for mispricing (Burkart and  Lee, 2016), and treat the deal as 
bad news (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Travlos, 1987), suggesting that the market react more 
favourably to cash-financed takeover transactions compared to stock-financed takeovers. This 
can be explained as firms tend to hold cash against expected shortfall to prevent them from 
underinvesting. Extending this argument to the Chinese market, Yang et al. (2017) posit that 
acquirers with financial constraints would rather pay with stock than cash on acquisitions. 
Alternatively, tax-based hypothesis posit that target shareholders may prefer to defer capital 
gains taxation by opting for share payment, this will postpone taxes until the stock is sold (see 
Fuller et al., 2002).   
Another important factor in corporate acquisition is the acquirer’s choice to buy either a public 
target firm or a private target firm (Bena and Li, 2014). Empirical literature has emphasised 
the impact on shareholder expectations of bidding firm following the choice of target firms. 
Fuller et al., (2002) explore reasons why  the acquisition of private targets elicit favourable 
shareholders’ reaction in relation to publicly-held targets  A growing body of literature presents 
three hypotheses (not mutually exclusive) that underpin shareholders preference for acquiring 
private firms in comparison to public firms. The first hypothesis (private firm discount) 
provides an alluring upside for bidding for non-listed firms. The hypothesis posits that private 
firms have lower quality or no observable financial information that impedes the pre-
acquisition evaluation process. Moreover, because private firms are more informationally 
opaque to the public, they are considered riskier than publicly held firms, inducing uncertainty 
about their future prospects. As a result, private firms are significantly less liquid, leading them 
to be acquired at a discount. In line with this view, John et al. (2010) find that the returns to 
acquirers of privately held targets are generally more favourable than publicly held targets. The 
second hypothesis (principal-agent) posits that firm’s management may seek to bid for private 
firms to either maximise shareholders’ wealth or enhance their private benefits tied up in the 
firm.5 Hence, the market may react more positively to takeover of privately held firms relative 







to public firms. The third hypothesis (information asymmetry) posits that because the many 
privately held firms are usually small with higher information asymmetry and according to 
Capron and Shen (2007), they might have weaker bargaining power because of (1) their 
illiquidity position, (2) lower interest from potential bidders, and (3) lower publicity and 
visibility on the acquisition process of privately held firms. Notwithstanding the arguments, 
Wulf (2004), provides evidence that greater bargaining power does not essentially generate 
positive gains for investors. 
 
2.1 Acquirer’s short and long-terms performances and payment methods 
 
Some studies have concluded that target firms outperform significantly both around the 
announcement day and in the long-term, but the acquirer’s performance over the same period 
is not conclusive (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). For example, Bruner (2004) conducts an 
overview of 50 studies focusing on short term performance of acquirers in merger and 
acquisition transactions. He finds that almost half of the researchers observed significant 
positive returns (Leeth and Borg, 2000), and one third of the papers including Smith and Kim 
(1994) and Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) state that abnormal returns were not significantly 
different from zero. However, Walker (2000) reports negative abnormal returns around the 
announcement periods. 
 
The findings of performance for bidders over long period after transaction are even more 
inconclusive than short-term results. According to Bruner (2004), about 60 percent of M&As 
studies report significant negative abnormal returns. For example, Agrawal, Jaffe and 
Mandelker (1992) and Gregory (1997) report abnormal returns of approximately 10% lower 
than zero and a range of -18% to -12% negative. These findings of negative returns of bidding 
firm support previous studies that only target shareholders benefit from merger and acquisitions.  
Some earlier studies have identified that long term performance examinations are dependent 
on benchmark issues (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; and Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003). 
  
In regard to cross-border and domestic M&As, most of the extent literature document that 
cross-border takeovers create lower value compared to domestic acquisitions. For example, 
Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) established same finding in the U.S; Conn et al (2005) and 
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Aw and Chatterjee (2004) in the U.K; Campa and Hernando (2004) and Goergen and 
Renneboog (2004) for Continental European, Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) for Canadan, and 
Lowinski et al. (2004) for Swiss markets. However, the results in emerging markets are 
different as studies show that bidders undertaking international M&A deals gained more 
returns compared to domestic ones (Rani et al., 2011; Barai and Mohanty, 2010; Gubbi et al, 
2010; Karels et al., 2011; and Zhu and Malhotra, 2008). However, few studies have focused 
on Chinese market, and many of them are limited to small sample sizes.   
 
Several studies have demonstrated that globally, cash offers can create more return to bidding 
firm shareholders than stock offers (Baker et al, 2012). This is because most foreign targets are 
unwilling to accept foreign companies’ shares, thus balancing off the positive effect of cash 
offer (Gaughan, 2002; Ye and Yuan, 2014). Boateng and Bi (2013) compared the pre-
announcement and post announcement returns with pure cash or stock payment in China 
M&As, and found that Chinese bidders report pre-deal abnormal returns varying from 14.29% 
to 121% over the period of 1 to 3 years prior to the announcement. However in the post-bid 
period, no significant difference between cash-financed and stock financed was found.   
 
 
2.2 Hypotheses development 
Extant literature suggests that payment methods used for takeover activities can influence 
acquirer’s stock returns (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). According to Martin (1996), M&A 
financing decisions can be classified into stock and cash. Cash payment method can generate 
higher positive abnormal returns than stock payments. An explanation for the phenomenon is 
that a rational investor knows that bidding management is better motivated to pay in cash when 
synergies are higher, hence paying with stock signals a lower level of synergy gains in the 
merger activities. For instance, The M&A deals financed with cash significantly outperform 
those financed by shares (Loughran and Vijh, 1997). Faccio and Masulis (2005) report that 
bidders choose cash financing to protect their voting power. Their study examined the bidders’ 
financing choice of M&A deals from 13 European countries over the period from 1997 to 2000, 
and find evidence that bidders are more likely to use cash-only financing if they are purchasing 
privately held targets. Similarly, Draper and Paudyal (2006) show that stock financing conveys 
‘bad’ news, whilst paying with cash generates significant positive abnormal returns for the 
acquirer shareholders. Additionally, Fu et al. (2013) find evidence that stock-financed 
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acquisitions (overvalued acquirers) increase target’s stock price and lower acquirer’s stock 
price. In regard to cross-border and domestic M&As, existing literature find that globally, cash 
offers create more return to bidding firm shareholders than stock offers (Black et al., 2015). 
On the contrary, research suggests that stock financing can generate higher positive abnormal 
returns for acquirer shareholders. For example, Dutta et al. (2013) examine the effect of 
financing decisions by Canadian bidders between 1993 and 2002 and find a significant positive 
abnormal return for stock-financed cross-border acquisitions. Similarly, Yang et al. (2017) 
indicate that bidders’ with higher growth opportunities prefer stock-financed acquisitions. 
Furthermore, Cho and Ahn (2017) document that despite the fact that M&As stock financing 
deals have a significant adverse effects on bidder shareholder value, it can be beneficial in 
takeovers with greater scope of information asymmetry and agency problems. In a related 
literature, Alexandridis et al. (2010) document that stock-financed acquisitions are generally 
not value destroying. This collaborate  Eckbo et al. (2018), that bidders concerned with adverse 
selection problems prefer to use stock financing  than cash financing. The contrasting evidence 
surmises that the effects of payment methods on acquisition performance are not obvious and 
hence we hypothesise in the alternate form: 
Hypothesis 1: In the Chinese context, paying with cash or stock will have no effect on 
acquirer’s performance.  
We next consider the effect of government and non-government involvement on acquirer 
merger activities and firm performance. It remains unsettled whether firms can benefit from 
government involvement in M&As activities in the Chinese market. According to Deng (2004, 
p.14), ‘Chinese government has, to a great extent, played a crucial role in shaping the structure 
of the country’s approved outward investment’. Calomiris et al. (2010) find that state-owned 
firms are normally less efficient than private companies. Nevertheless, few studies have shed 
light on the relationship between government connection and Chinese merger and acquisition 
activities. Of the limited studies, Wang et al. (2012) suggest that bidders with strong 
government connection are dominant in the bidding competition against private firms. This is 
because Chinese government plays a decisive role in the economy and business activities, and 
bidding against them might incur unsettling results. For some industries that are held as crucial 
to national defence such as the oil and military sector, only the bidders that are approved by 
government can take part in the bidding process. In addition, government connection can 
supply excessive financial support for merger and acquisition (Frye and Shleifer, 1997). 
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Therefore, our second hypothesis is in the null form as: 
Hypothesis 2a: Shareholders of bidding firms with government influence in takeover activities 
will not gain more abnormal returns than shareholders of bidding firms without government 
influence. 
Hypothesis 2b: Shareholders of bidding firms with government involvement in takeover 
activities will not gain more abnormal returns whether paying with cash or stocks. 
Hypothesis 2c: Shareholders of bidding firm without government involvement in takeover 
activities will not gain more abnormal returns whether paying with cash or stocks. 
Next, we consider the effect of acquiring private or public targets on short-run firms’ 
performance. A growing body of research documents negative abnormal returns to acquisitions 
of publicly targeted firms (Ang and Kohers, 2001, and Fuller et al., 2002).   The excess return 
for acquirers can be seen as a compensation for bearing the liquidity risk which refers to the 
difficulty in converting target stocks or assets into cash at full price.  Private firms are therefore 
less attractive targets than public firms and hence less valuable than listed firms (Fuller et al., 
2002). In addition, as the liquidity risk of private targets exists, the illiquidity asset is less likely 
to be targeted by acquirers, which limits the bidding competition. As a result, an acquirer will 
not have to pay a higher premium. Therefore, the post-performance of the bidder acquiring 
private target should be better than those acquiring listed targets (Ang and Kohers, 2001). For 
example, Faccio et al. (2006) provide evidence that bidders acquiring privately held firms earn 
favourable abnormal returns than public acquirers. Similarly, Mantecon (2008) shows that 
bidders benefit from the acquisition of private firms but not so in the purchase of public firms. 
In the same vein, John et al. (2010) show that the abnormal returns to bidders of private targets 
are more favourable than publicly targets.  
Despite the fact that literature on the acquisitions of public firms has been well documented, 
studies on returns to acquisitions of private firms relating to emerging economies is scanty 
(Erel et al., 2012). Given that the findings on the developed markets cannot be generalised 
because of the substantial differences in M&As activities between the developed and less-
developed markets (Zhou et al, 2016), we argue that the impact on emerging markets are 
subject to empirical validation. Consequently, this leads to our third null hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 3a: Bidder acquiring private firms will not outperform those acquiring public firms. 
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Hypothesis 3b: Bidder acquiring public firms will not gain abnormal return paying with cash 
or stock 
Hypothesis 3c: Bidder acquiring private firms will not gain abnormal return paying with cash 
or stock 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Sample and data collection 
This study investigates the impact of M&As deals on firm performance of all takeovers bids 
involving Chinese acquirers between 1993 and 2015. This period is chosen as it was the time 
of enormous economic growth in China. We obtain our dataset on M&As deals from the 
Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database provided by 
Thomson Financial and apply the following selection criteria: (i) all acquirers must be Chinese 
firms and listed in either of the two Chinese stock exchange markets Shanghai (SHCOMP)  and 
Shenzhen (SZCOMP ) composite index  (ii) the acquirers do not hold more than 50% of the 
target firms before the bid and will hold more than 50% of the target firms afterwards, which 
means that only acquiring equity is considered, (iii) the acquirers must not have announced 
other capital actions such as announcement of dividends, seasonal offering of new shares, and 
announcement of new investment that might have effect on the share prices within 30 days 
prior and after the takeover, (iv) in order to test the announcement effect of the takeover event, 
it is essential to exclude the acquirers that have multiple takeovers, and this significantly 
reduces the sample size, (v) we require all acquirers to have been trading for at least 100 days 
during the pre-event period of 250 trading days window to have enough observations to 
estimate the benchmark, and (vi) all acquirers should have daily prices data available on 
DataStream. We require bidders to have share price data in DataStream. These criteria lead to 
our final sample of 842 cases of Chinese M&As deals, comprising 112 government involved 
acquisitions and 730 non-government involved takeovers.  
Table 1a summarises the information of deals of each category in each year. The study runs 
from 1993 to 2015 and with more than 50% of deals occurring in years 2013 to 2015. The 
majority of the acquisitions are private firms. While 789 firms are privately target firms, only 
53 acquisitions are publicly targeted firms. Table 1b indicates the sample distribution in terms 
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of the industry composition, as reported by DataStream.6 There are large differences across 
industries in the composition of acquirers. We observe the industrial sector constitutes high 
acquisitive industry with about 33.8 percent of Chinese acquirers followed by the consumer 
goods industry with 17.8 percent acquirers. Obviously, the table shows our sample is 
underrepresented in non-industrial sectors. Table 1c shows distribution by type of acquisition 
and government involvement.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
3.2 Methodology 
In this paper, we follow standard event study methodology discussed in Brown and Warner 
(1985) to analyse the short-term performance of acquiring firms. This approach is consistent 
with previous M&A research (Aybar and Ficici, 2009, Tao et al., 2017 and Nnadi and Aghanya, 
2018) in assessing market’s reaction at the acquisition announcement. The underlying 
assumption of event study methodology is that stock price instantaneously reflects all relevant 
information (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). In addition, Schwert (1981) points out that the price 
of a firm’s stock represents unbiased net present values of its future cash flows as price changes 
to account for investor’s current and future expectations about firm performance associated 
with the announcement. Hence, the method assesses market efficiency reflected in the 
abnormal return surrounding the corporate events. Accordingly, we can attribute the abnormal 
return, without any other jointly announcement event, to the effect of announcement of merger 
and acquisition. The method is less susceptible to omitted variable problem because of the short 
time intervals. We identify the actual announcement date as event Day-0 for our event study 
because it was the day the firm declared the merger activity, and investors could instantly react 
to new informational content (Fama, 1970). Thus, to gauge market responses to the acquisition 
announcement, we estimate the abnormal returns (AR) over an event window using the market 
model defined as:    
 ARit = αit ∓ βiRmt   +  eit                               (1) 
 




6 We use DataStream Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB) indices (level 1).    
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where ARit is the abnormal return of company 𝑖 at day 𝑡, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return for firm 𝑖 at day t, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the return of the market at day t, alpha (α) and beta (β) for each bidding firm is obtained 
by regressing the returns of the company on the returns of the market over the estimation 
window of 250 trading days ending 30 days prior to event day 0.7 To examine the wealth effects 
of M&As, we calculate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR), which is a measure of market 
reaction to news over the event window (𝑇1, 𝑇2). We employ the market model by summing 
the abnormal returns over the event window for each stock as follows:   𝐶𝐴𝑅 (𝑇1, 𝑇2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑇2𝑇1                     (2) 
and for a sample of N transactions, the cross-sectional cumulative average abnormal return is 
given as follows: 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 (𝑇1, 𝑇2) = 1𝑁 ∑ ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑇2𝑇1𝑁𝑖=1                        (3) 
where CAAR denotes cumulative average abnormal returns, N is the number of companies, 𝑇1 is the beginning of the event window and 𝑇2 is the end of the event window. To further 
investigate whether fluctuation in stock prices influence the CAAR, we test the statistical 
significance using the cross-sectional data, the test-statistic is calculated by the following 
formula: 𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 (𝑇1,𝑇2)?̂?𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 (𝑇1,𝑇2)                  (4) 
where, 𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 is the test-statistic of the cumulative average abnormal returns,    ?̂?2𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 (𝑇1,𝑇2) = 1𝑁(𝑁−𝑑) ∑ [𝐶𝐴𝑅 (𝑇1, 𝑇2) − 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 (𝑇1, 𝑇2)]2𝑁𝑖=1                            (5) 
in which d is the degree of freedom and  ?̂?2𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 (𝑇1,𝑇2) is the variance of each firm during the 
event period.     
Following Boehmer et al. (1991) and Corrado and Truong (2008), we apply both parametric 
and non-parametric test statistics to address any skewness bias. Each of the statistics tests the 
null hypothesis that population abnormal returns are zero; but the assumptions of the statistical 
characteristics of the abnormal return are different. The parametric test indirectly assumes that 
the residuals follow normal distribution, whereas the non-parametric test does not demand strict 




7 The 250 trading days corresponds to about one year of trading (see Acemoglu et al., 2016) 
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assumptions about return distribution and are generally used together with parametric test to 
confirm that the outcomes are not driven by outliers. Regarding parametric test, Boehmer test 
is applied, while we apply the Corrado’s rank test statistic with regards to the non-parametric 
test (Boehmer et al., 1991 and Corrado 1989).  
Boehmer et al, (1991) show that if the variance of stock returns increases around the event date, 
the standardised residuals test rejects the null hypothesis too often. They combine the 
standardised residuals test with an empirical variance estimate, based on the cross section of 
event-window abnormal returns, to construct a test that is robust to event-induced variance of 
stock returns. Corrado (1989) proposes a non-parametric rank test by transforming all abnormal 
returns into ranks for every asset in each estimation period. We present all tests as discussed 
above to make more reliable statistic inference.  
Since extant literature does not have a laid down criteria for the suitable length of the event 
window, and as more observations can contribute to the credibility of parameter estimation in 
regression, we follow (Aybar and Ficici, 2009 and Tao et al., 2017) and consider a short event 
window because a longer window can reduce the chance in observing any reliable evidence. 
As a result, we use a 1-day (0), 3-day (-1, +1), 5-day (-2, +2), 7-day (-3, +3), and 11-day (-5, 
+5) event window around the announcement date to investigate investors’ short-term reaction 
to the merger declaration.8  
In addition to using market returns to estimate CAR (Brown and Warner, 1985), we also use 
market adjusted return as our second approach to establish the robustness of our results. The 
method involves no estimation but rather market-adjusts raw returns in order to attenuate 
confounding news caused by potentially overlapping and concurrent observations that could 
have an impact on stock prices. Thus, market adjusted abnormal return (ARit) is calculated as 
the difference between the actual stock return (Rit) and the market return (Rmt).  Table 2 
provides descriptive statistics of the market reaction to M&A announcements for the bidding 
firms.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 




8  We choose the maximum of eleven-day period (-5, +5), that is, five trading days pre- and post-merger 
announcement because Kiesel et al. (2017) note that using extended event windows would obviously increase the 




On the day of announcement of the deals (Day 0), the bidding firms earn a positive and highly 
significant 2.46% abnormal return. The results represent acquiring firm shareholders’ 
perception of expected positive synergistic wealth gains from the mergers [see also Savor and 
Lu, 2009). In economic terms, the results suggest $49.5 million in acquirers’ market value on 
Day-0. The positive impact is also shown in larger event windows such as the CAAR (-3, +3) 
and CAAR (-5, +5). Similarly, the mean value of the market-adjusted cumulative average 
abnormal return (MCAAR) for -2 +2 is 0.058 and a t-test (13.48) indicates that MCAAR is 
significantly different from zero.    
4. Empirical results and discussion of findings 
4.1 The effect of using stock-financed or cash-financed acquisitions on firm performance 
In this section, we follow Tao et al. (2017) empirical method to test our hypotheses.9 First, we 
examine the impact of M&A on short-term firm performance relating to choice of payment. 
Table 3 reports our empirical results of five different event windows based on acquiring firms 
paying either by stock or cash.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
The results show positive abnormal returns and are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
These findings support the merger and acquisition trend in the Chinese market (Tao et al., 2017 
and Yang et al., 2017). Chi et al. (2011) suggest that positive announcement returns is 
attributable to low M&A competition in China. However, the results are contrary to the 
findings in many developed markets where acquirers report negative and statistically 
significant abnormal returns (e.g., Sudarsanam et al., 1996, Holl and Kyriazis, 1997, and Nnadi 
and Aghanya, 2018). For the acquiring firms paying with stock, the CAAR ranges from 4.5% 
to 14.3% and are statistically significant for all chosen event windows around the 
announcement date. For bidders paying with cash, the CAAR ranges from 0.8% to 1.9% and 
are statistically significant. The findings show that market reaction to firms acquiring with 
stock is more significant than acquiring with cash. This is unexpected as it shows that Chinese 
investors treat cash financing of merger and acquisition as less of good news. A plausible 




9 This is similar to Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) empirical methodology.  
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reason could be since cash payment could attract capital gains tax implications, the market may 
value stock offer to defer taxation.  
As shown in Table 3, the mean difference between CAAR of stock and cash is positive and 
statistically significant at the 10% level for the periods of (0,0) and (-1, +1). This demonstrates 
that stock as the deal payment method creates higher announcement returns for shareholders.  
Thus, the results in Table 3 rejects our hypothesis (1) and indicates that stock acquisition tend 
to outperform cash acquisition. The results are in line with Yang et al.  (2017) which examined 
the effect of corporate liquidity on M&A decision in China and find that cash-financed 
acquisitions underperform stock-financed ones. 
 
4.2 The effects of government (non-)involvement on acquirers’ short-term performance. 
Finally, we analyse the short-term wealth effects of the influence of government and non-
government involvement in bidder merger activities. Table 4a presents the result of the 
empirical analysis.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The result shows that the CAARs over all the event windows are positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level irrespective of whether acquirers have government involvement or 
not which suggests that shareholders perceive acquisition as value maximising. The results 
show that the CAARs of acquirers without the influence of government intervention for all 
event windows surrounding the announcement are larger than the CAARs of those with 
government intervention. This indicates that the influence of Chinese government has not 
yielded substantial positive announcement gains for shareholders. A probable reason could be 
that shareholders view that government involvement may undermine sensitivities of investment, 
and thus lower future cash flow and weaken returns (e.g., see Black et al., 2015). However, the 
mean difference is not statistically significant. The evidence in Table 4 supports Hypothesis 
(2a), which suggests that shareholders of bidding firms with government involvement in 
merger activities do not gain more abnormal returns than shareholders of bidding firm without 
government involvement. 
To explore the issue further, we consider effects of financing decision on acquisition with and 
without government involvement. In Table 4b, we report the results of the empirical analysis 
of cash-financed and stock-financed acquisitions with(out) government influence. We find that 
for government influenced acquisitions, using cash as means of financing decisions generate 
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higher abnormal returns of the acquiring shareholders on the announcement date (0, 0). 
However, for the other event windows surrounding the announcement date, (-1, +1), (-2, +2), 
(-3, +3), and (-5, +5), the mean difference is negative supporting that cash-financed acquisition, 
is not statistically different from zero, and that shareholders are indifferent on the mode of 
payment of government influenced acquisitions. For the non-government involved acquisitions, 
the CAARs for stock-financed acquisitions are higher than cash-financed acquisitions and the 
mean difference are statistically significant at the 1% level for all event windows. The results 
show that there are asymmetric market reactions to the choice of payment used by the non-
government influenced bidders. The findings imply that stock-financed acquisition creates 
higher returns for shareholders of Chinese non-government acquirers than cash-financed 
acquisitions. Thus, the evidence opposes Hypothesis 2c.  
 
4.3 The effect of acquiring private versus public firms on short-term firm performance 
Next, we examine acquirer shareholders’ perception of acquiring privately and publicly held 
targets. Table 5a shows the results of empirical analysis of the CAAR based on acquisition of 
public and private firms. The test results show that the CAAR for all the event windows are 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The findings show that on average, the 
CAARs for private acquisitions range from 2.51% to 7.46% and are higher than public 
acquisitions with CAARs ranging from 1.78% to 6.05% around the announcement date. In 
addition, the difference between the CAARs for public acquisition and private acquisition is 
statistically significant at event windows (0, 0) and (-1, +1), suggesting that investors perceive 
private acquisitions as value maximising deals. Moreover, the results suggest that the 
performance implications for shareholders of acquiring firms differ depending on the type of 
acquisition. Bidding for a private firm generate more abnormal returns for the acquirer’s 
shareholders than bidding for publicly held firms. A probable reason is that private firms can 
be seen as the ‘engine of growth of the Chinese economy’ (Guariglia et al. 2011, p.80), hence 
their acquisition will yield significant wealth gain for their shareholders. However, when 
analysed over 5-day (-2, +2), 7-day (-3, +3) and 11-day (-5, +5), the CAAR mean differences 
are indistinguishable from zero, suggesting that from 5-day around the announcement event, 
shareholders of acquiring firms do not consider type of acquisition as substantial event. Overall, 
our empirical analysis rejects the null hypothesis (3a) and suggests that bidder acquiring private 
firms will outperform those acquiring public firms. 
18 
  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Further, we explore the impact of choice of payment in acquiring private and publicly held 
targets. In Table 5b, we report the results of public and private acquisitions base on choice of 
payment. For publicly held acquisitions, we find that  the abnormal returns for using cash is 
greater than using stock as financing decision and their mean difference is not statistically 
significant.  This suggests that there is no significant difference in the choice of payment 
method used in acquiring public firms. This may be attributable to investors expecting less 
takeover gains whether using cash or stock as choice of acquisitions of public firms. Thus, our 
hypothesis 3b is accepted. On the contrary, for private acquisitions, CAARs of using stock-
financed deals is greater than it is for cash-financed acquisitions and the mean difference is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, investors perceive that using stock 
to purchase private acquisition will generate extra wealth than using cash. The result can also 
be explained from the perspective that  bidders acquiring private firms have more valuable 
investment opportunities, which requires them to generate higher cash flow streams and hence 
the more eager to use stock to finance acquisitions. Therefore, we reject hypothesis 3c.  
 
4.4 Robustness checks 
To ensure reliability of our results, robustness checks for the short-term performance are 
conducted. We employ the market-adjusted cumulative average abnormal returns (MCAARs) 
for our event study analysis. Table 6 presents the results for hypotheses 1, 2a and 3a. The 
MCAARs in Panel A are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The positive 
MCAARs of stock-financed acquisition is higher than cash-financed acquisition and support 
our findings in Table 3 and confirms that shareholders views stock-financing as better spring 
board investment decision choice compared to cash payment. The results in panels B and C 
also corroborate the earlier findings in Tables 4 and 5 respectively.   
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the performances of the Chinese acquirer with different financing 
decisions and targets (private and public). It also explores the influence of government 
involvement in acquirers’ merger activities. Specifically, we find that deals financed by stock 
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create more value than those financed with cash. In addition, we find evidence that acquirer 
shareholders experience higher CAARs on acquiring privately-held target than those acquiring 
publicly-held targets. Further, we show evidence that acquirers without government 
involvement report more abnormal returns than bidders with government involvement. Our 
results demonstrate that: (1) shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms perceive acquisition to be 
value maximising, (2) shareholders of acquirers using stock as the deal payment method realise 
superior wealth gains than their cash-paying acquiring counterparts, and (3) shareholder 
perceive that government involved acquisitions do not generate more value than non-
government involved acquisitions. Taken together, our study provides new insight on the effect 
of choice of payment, government involvement, and choice of target on short-term M&As 
performance in China.  
Our results have implications for business acquisitions in China. For example, acquirers would 
benefit from considering stock payment option rather than cash. Politically connected firms 
and the government will improve the wealth of Chinese investors and shareholders by reducing 
the level of influence on government induced acquisitions. 
Finally, our study has some limitations. First, though the research focuses on Chinese firms 
which are specific to the context of the research, future research should consider other emerging 
economies, such as countries in Africa, Russia, India, and Indonesia. Second, we investigate 
only publicly listed firms available in SDC and DataStream, future research could extend to 
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Table 1a  
Panel A. Sample distribution by announcement year 





















1995 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0.12 
1996 3 2 0 5 5 0 0 5 0.59 
1997 1 1 0 2 2 0 0 2 0.24 
1998 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0.12 
2000 1 1 0 2 2 0 0 2 0.24 
2001 0 5 1 4 5 0 0 5 0.59 
2002 2 8 1 9 9 1 0 10 1.19 
2003 2 12 0 14 13 1 0 14 1.66 
2004 10 18 1 27 27 0 1 28 3.33 
2005 3 11 0 14 14 0 0 14 1.66 
2006 8 10 1 17 16 2 0 18 2.14 
2007 5 28 0 33 25 7 1 33 3.92 
2008 6 54 7 53 39 18 3 60 7.13 
2009 11 34 6 39 31 11 3 45 5.34 
2010 12 49 3 58 43 11 7 61 7.24 
2011 10 60 7 63 59 7 4 70 8.31 
2012 12 68 7 73 61 12 7 80 9.50 
2013 13 101 8 106 69 22 23 114 13.54 
2014 11 177 6 182 90 32 66 188 22.33 
2015 2 89 5 86 38 16 37 91 10.81 
Total 112 730 53 789 550 140 152 842 100.00 
Note: The sample consists of 854 completed China mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between January 1993 and June 2015. Cash and stock represent 
the number of deals with each method and mix is a combination of cash and stock. The sample period is from 1993 to 2015. Table 1b presents, by industry, 
the fraction of acquiring firms. Industry data are classified using DataStream Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB) indices (level 1) that sorts firms into 





Table 1b. Industry distribution of acquiring firms  
Acquirers’ industry category N % of sample 
Acquirer average 
market value ($’m) 
Industrials 285 33.85 1,032 
Consumer Goods 150 17.81 825 
Basic Materials 126 14.96 1,985 
Financials 67 7.96 6,164 
Technology 63 7.48 923 
Consumer Services 60 7.13 1,233 
Health Care 51 6.06 890 
Utilities 23 2.73 837 
Oil & Gas 15 1.78 27,715 
Telecommunications 2 0.24 818 
Total 842 100.00 2,013 
 
Table 1c. Distribution of acquiring firms by type of acquisitions and government involvement 
Involvement N 
Acquirer average 
market value ($’m) 
Acquirers without government involvement 730 1,199 
Acquirers with government involvement 112 7,319 
   
Type of acquisition   
Private acquisition 789 2,026 
Public acquisition 53 1,816 
 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics 
The table summarises market reaction to M&A announcements of Chinese acquirers. 





CAAR(0, 0) 0.0246*** 0.0490 14.629 -0.0083 0.0088 0.0682 523:319 62.1 
CAAR(-1, +1) 0.0418*** 0.0877 13.887 -0.0138 0.0156 0.0945 527:315 62.6 
CAAR(-2, +2) 0.0552*** 0.1181 13.599 -0.0164 0.0205 0.1135 522:320 62.0 
CAAR(-3, +3) 0.0650*** 0.1441 12.976 -0.0231 0.0237 0.1136 520:322 61.8 
CAAR(-5, +5) 0.0737*** 0.1811 11.839 -0.0292 0.0199 0.1147 507:335 60.2 
MCAAR(0, 0) 0.0253*** 0.0491 14.871 -0.0079 0.0097 0.0716 527:315 62.6 
MCAAR(-1, +1) 0.0438*** 0.0881 13.717 -0.0135 0.0173 0.0956 537:305 63.8 
MCAAR(-2, +2) 0.0584*** 0.1181 13.481 -0.0171 0.0233 0.1145 536:306 63.7 
MCAAR(-3, +3) 0.0694*** 0.1435 12.052 -0.0201 0.0264 0.1208 544:298 64.6 





Table 3. Market reaction: Stock payment vs. cash payment 
  Stock payment   Cash payment   
Event window N CAAR t-Stat 
Boehmer 
Corrado 






CAAR(0, 0) 140 0.0449*** 9.502 9.404 7.757  550 0.0084*** 5.065 4.659 4.022 0.0365 2.252** 
CAAR(-1, +1) 140 0.0792*** 9.267 9.286 8.293  550 0.0133*** 4.770 4.500 2.891 0.0659 1.869* 
CAAR(-2, +2) 140 0.1006*** 8.524 8.605 7.701  550 0.0172*** 4.721 4.569 2.452 0.0834 1.574 
CAAR(-3, +3) 140 0.1224*** 8.342 8.290 7.822  550 0.0182*** 4.238 4.126 1.603 0.1042 1.540 
CAAR(-5, +5) 140 0.1432*** 7.323 7.342 6.526  550 0.0189*** 3.698 3.660 0.565 0.1243 1.297 






Table 4a. Market reaction: Acquirer with government involvement vs.  Acquirer without government involvement 
  Acquirers with government involvement   Acquirers without government involvement Mean Difference 
Event window N CAARG  t-Stat 
Boehmer 
Corrado 






CAAR(0, 0) 112 0.0207*** 4.983 4.605 5.455  730 0.0261*** 13.762 13.354 9.418   -0.0054    0.125  
CAAR(-1, +1) 112 0.0368*** 4.815 4.740 4.956  730 0.0449*** 13.021 12.701 8.722   -0.0081    0.099  
CAAR(-2, +2) 112 0.0447*** 4.541 4.565 4.124  730 0.0605*** 12.817 12.467 8.480   -0.0157    0.144  
CAAR(-3, +3) 112 0.0523*** 4.510 4.525 3.768  730 0.0720*** 12.173 11.851 7.905   -0.0197    0.156  
CAAR(-5, +5) 112 0.0668*** 4.629 4.519 3.635  730 0.0848*** 10.941 10.687 6.088   -0.0180    0.119  













Table 4b. Cash and stock CAR difference test results for Acquirer with government involvement vs.  
Acquirer without government involvement. 
 Acquirers with government involvement  
 CAR  
Event window Stock Cash Mean difference t-test 
CAAR(0, 0) 0.0135 0.0395 -0.0260** -2.384 
CAAR(-1, +1) 0.0288 0.0654 -0.0366 -1.592 
CAAR(-2, +2) 0.0341 0.0803 -0.0462 -1.403 
CAAR(-3, +3) 0.0395 0.0917 -0.0522 -1.252 
CAAR(-5, +5) 0.0507 0.1035 -0.0528 -0.958 
   
 Acquirers without government involvement  
Event window Stock Cash Mean difference t-test 
CAAR(0, 0) 0.1326 0.0127 0.1199*** 6.151 
CAAR(-1, +1) 0.1178 0.0136 0.1042*** 6.799 
CAAR(-2, +2) 0.0988 0.0139 0.0849*** 6.655 
CAAR(-3, +3) 0.0777 0.0103 0.0674*** 7.211 
















Table 5a. Market reaction: Public acquisition vs private acquisition 
  Public acquisition   Private acquisition Mean difference 
Event window N CAARPU t-Stat 
Boehmer 
Corrado 






CAAR(0, 0) 53 0.0178*** 2.731 2.934 3.106  789 0.0251*** 14.394 13.816 10.023 -0.0073*** -2.939 
CAAR(-1, +1) 53 0.0297** 2.368 2.414 2.759  789 0.0426*** 13.741 13.372 9.278 -0.0129*** -4.133 
CAAR(-2, +2) 53 0.0466*** 2.664 2.837 2.805  789 0.0558*** 13.367 12.973 8.794 -0.0092 -0.984 
CAAR(-3, +3) 53 0.0584*** 2.814 2.889 2.785  789 0.0655*** 12.674 12.351 8.143 -0.0071 -1.074 
CAAR(-5, +5) 53 0.0605*** 2.440 2.549 2.114  789 0.0746*** 11.591 11.307 6.490 -0.0141 -0.421 
























Table 5b. Cash and stock CAR difference for public acquisition vs private acquisition 
Public acquisition 
 CAR  
Event window Stock Cash Mean difference t-test 
CAAR(0, 0) 0.0103 0.0151 -0.0048 -0.160 
CAAR(-1, +1) 0.0093 0.0258 -0.0165 -0.215 
CAAR(-2, +2) 0.0662 0.032 0.0342 0.314 
CAAR(-3, +3) 0.0922 0.0427 0.0495 0.408 
CAAR(-5, +5) 0.1560 0.0324 0.1236 0.742 
 Private acquisition  
Event window Stock Cash Mean difference t-test 
CAAR(0, 0) 0.0441 0.0078 0.0363*** 7.531 
CAAR(-1, +1) 0.0792 0.0122 0.0670*** 7.916 
CAAR(-2, +2) 0.0980 0.0158 0.0822*** 7.066 
CAAR(-3, +3) 0.1157 0.0157 0.1000*** 7.046 


















Table 6. Investor reaction using market cumulative average abnormal returns (MCAAR) 
Panel A.  Stock payment   Cash payment Mean difference 
Event window N CAARPU t-Stat 
Boehmer 
Corrado 






MCAAR(0, 0) 140 0.0435*** 9.135 9.440 7.448  550 0.0087*** 5.147 4.316 4.066 0.0348** 2.169 
MCAAR(-1, +1) 140 0.0773*** 9.667 9.343 8.123  550 0.0147*** 4.217 4.652 2.869 0.0626* 1.797 
MCAAR(-2, +2) 140 0.0989*** 8.145 8.113 7.787  550 0.0197*** 4.117 4.236 2.375 0.0792 1.501 
MCAAR(-3, +3) 140 0.1192*** 8.443 8.343 7.558  550 0.0221*** 4.254 4.211 1.570 0.0970 1.434 
MCAAR(-5, +5) 140 0.1325*** 7.123 7.333 6.391  550 0.0255*** 3.462 3.866 0.757 0.1070 1.151 
              
Panel B.  Acquirers with government involvement   Acquirers without government involvement  
MCAAR(0, 0) 112 0.0205*** 4.841 4.336 5.168  730 0.0253*** 13.747 12.921 9.404 -0.0048   -0.111  
MCAAR(-1, +1) 112 0.0380*** 4.796 4.533 4.234  730 0.0424*** 12.615 12.891 8.231 -0.0044   -0.053  
MCAAR(-2, +2) 112 0.0478*** 4.365 3.733 3.930  730 0.0564*** 12.625 11.716 7.859 -0.0086   -0.079  
MCAAR(-3, +3) 112 0.0546*** 4.611 4.525 3.758  730 0.0666*** 11.245 10.895 7.257 -0.0121   -0.096  
MCAAR(-5, +5) 112 0.0686*** 4.629 4.619 3.628  730 0.0745*** 10.290 10.498 5.639 -0.0060   -0.039  
              
Panel C.  Public acquisition   Private acquisition  
MCAAR(0, 0) 53 0.0184*** 2.663 2.669 3.311  789 0.0258*** 14.129 13.445 10.242 -0.0074*** -6.050 
MCAAR(-1, +1) 53 0.0313** 2.312 2.641 2.666  789 0.0447*** 13.385 13.112 9.343 -0.0133*** -5.909 
MCAAR(-2, +2) 53 0.0512*** 2.567 2.678 2.777  789 0.0588*** 13.114 12.456 8.658 -0.0076 -1.060 
MCAAR(-3, +3) 53 0.0653*** 2.778 2.677 2.658  789 0.0697*** 12.227 12.114 8.056 -0.0044 -0.690 
MCAAR(-5, +5) 53 0.0700** 2.334 2.556 2.041  789 0.0833*** 11.116 11.256 6.219 -0.0132 -0.172 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively using t-statistics.   
 
 
 
 
